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DUNS SCOTUS ON THE GOODNESS OF GOD I 
Marilyn McCord Adams 
Over the past thirty years. analytical philosophers of religion have confronted the problem 
of evil in the guise of the atheistic argument from evil against the existence of God. 
Many have met it from the posture of defense, constructing logically possible morally 
sufficient reasons for divine permission of evils from the materials of religion-neutral 
value-theory. At best, such defenses vindicate divine goodness along the dimension 
"producer of global goods," while neglecting the religiously more relevant dimension of 
His goodness to individual suffering creatures. My methodological recommendation is 
that we Christian philosophers shift away from defense and concentrate on formulating 
what we really believe about the goodness of God and how He is solving the problem 
of evil. If successful, our accounts would not only exhibit how divine permission of evils 
is logically consistent with His goodness to creatures, but also advertise Him as a character 
worthy of worship. Failures would pinpoint more precisely where and how evil is a 
problem for us. 1 illustrate this method by examining Duns Scotus' many-faceted concep-
tion of divine goodness and measure its power to explain the compossibility of God and evil. 
Over the last thirty years or so, we analytic philosophers of religion have tended 
to grapple with the religious problem of suffering under the guise of the so-called 
"logical" argument from evil for atheism: viz., that since it is logically impossible 
that an essentially omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good God coexist with 
evil, God must not exist because evil plainly does. Many of us have agreed that 
solutions (if any) must take the form of generating logically possible morally 
sufficient reasons that even a perfect being might have for not preventing or 
eliminating evils in the amounts and the kinds found in the actual world. 
Moreover, many of us have conducted our search for such divine excuses from 
the posture of defense, seeking to undermine the charge of inconsistency by 
appeal to value-premisses that the atheistic arguer qua atheist might accept (or 
at least could not conclusively discredit) rather than to doctrinal claims peculiar 
to believers. If our defense is from the Best of All Possible Worlds, we invoke 
G. E. Moore's notion of organic unity to suggest (via Leibniz) how a craftsman 
may be morally permitted to include negatively valued parts as necessary con-
stituents of (means to) a whole greater in value than any whole entirely lacking 
in negatively valued parts. We then mount an appeal to ignorance, that for all 
we know, the Best of All Possible Worlds contains evils in the amounts and of 
the kinds found in this world; and conclude that the atheist is not entitled to his 
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charge of incompatibility. 2 If we prefer the Free Will Defense, we commend a 
world with a favorable balance of moral good over moral evil as a logically 
possible and morally permissible divine goal, maintain that moral responsibility 
presupposes freedom, contend that not even an omnipotent God could ensure a 
world including free creatures but no evils, and conclude as before that the 
atheistic arguer has not made out his case. 3 
Whatever the merits of such defenses, they have the defect of leading us away 
from the religious question that gives rise to the atheistic argument in the first 
place: viz., whether and how, in view of sufferings many and great, God (if He 
exists) could be good enough to suffering creatures to warrant their love and 
trust. Portraying God as a possible producer of such global goods as the Best 
of All Possible Worlds, or a world containing free creatures or a favorable 
balance of moral virtue over moral vice or a perfect order of retributive justice, 
may vindicate divine character along one dimension of goodness, but it fails to 
confront the issue of His agent-centered goodness. Yet, as Ivan Karamazov's 
speeches eloquently show, God's worthiness of worship (of whole-hearted love 
and unreserved trust) cannot be adequately defended apart from His goodness 
in th i slatter respect. 
For my part, I would like to suggest a methodological change of pace. What 
if some of us Christian philosophers shifted off the project of defense and tried 
to articulate what we actually believe about God's goodness and how He is 
solving the problem of evil? Christian metaphysics would examine the goodness 
of God as He is in Himself, while soteriology would chart how God is being 
good to created persons. Our attempted formulations would then be measured 
for adequacy against both the canons of consistency and the convictions of the 
wider Christian community. Failures would pinpoint more precisely where and 
how evil is a problem for believers; and Faith seeking Understanding would send 
us in pursuit, with both heart and philosophical mind, of a more profound grasp 
of the mysterious goodness of God. To the extent that we succeed, our solutions 
might not only exhibit the compossibility of God and evil, but also commend 
God as a character worthy of worship. If the atheistic arguer could not share 
our value theory, he might at least gain a better understanding of our position 
or even come to appreciate how reasonable people could find it attractive! 
Although my purpose is methodological, my approach is historical. To illustrate 
my proposal, I shall begin by reviewing Duns Scotus' many-faceted conception 
of divine goodness. I choose Scotus because he is perhaps less known than 
others, and because his picture of God's creative and redemptive purpose is 
novel and stimulating. 5 As we shall see, his resultant theology is not immune to 
the problem of evil. But our investigation will re-identify its location in the light 
of Christian soteriology. 
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1. God's Metaphysical Goodness and Divine Justice: 
Scotus distinguishes among metaphysical or natural, moral, and supernatural 
or meritorious goodness. The interaction of his philosophical and theological 
value intuitions yields a modified naturalism to which he appeals in showing 
how an appreciation of God's metaphysical goodness delineates the obligations 
of justice for rational free agents, created and divine. 
Scotus believes that he can demonstrate a priori the existence of an infinite 
being, which is the first efficient cause and ultimate end of everything else, the 
most eminent being, and one which acts by intellect and will. 6 As dependent, 
any other being is finite. Following ancient Greek value-theory, Scotus assumes 
that in a transcendental sense, 'being' and 'good' convert (art truly predicable 
of all and only the same things), the latter signifying being under the aspect of 
desirability or amiability; while natural goodness pertains to the perfection of a 
thing (e.g., a blind man has transcendental goodness, but is defective in natural 
goodness because humans are normally sighted).7 Both the transcendental and 
natural goodness of a thing are proportionate to its degree of being. 8 The infinite 
being is the infinite good and infinitely desirable or lovable; finite beings are 
only finite goods, only finitely desirable or lovable. 
Ancient naturalists in value-theory held that the metaphysical or natural good-
ness of a thing imposed a moral obligation on agents to love it. According to 
them, the moral goodness of an agent consists in following what its right reason 
dictates, and right reason would surely judge that a thing is to be loved in 
proportion to its amiability. The logical outcome of such naturalism would 
seemingly be that an agent's obligation to love a thing is directly proportionate 
to that thing's degree of being, so that one ought to love better beings more than 
lesser ones--e.g., angels more than humans, dogs more than rocks. 
Scotus does not fully agree. Apparently, he reckons that since the infinite 
good is incommensurate with any finite good (or collection of finite goods), 
there could be no good reason for not loving the infinite good above all and for 
its own sake. Hence, right reason would dictate universally to any agent, that 
"the best ought to be loved the most."9 Since not all finite goods are mutually 
compatible, there can always be a reason against loving any finite good. Hence, 
there is no unconditional obligation for any agent to love any finite good. 
It follows that "God is no debtor in any unqualified sense save with respect 
to His own goodness, namely, that He love it"l0 and "there is no justice in God 
except that which inclines Him to render to His own goodness what is its due. "II 
Indeed, 
"there is nothing in the divine will that inclines it specifically to any 
secondary object in such a way that it would be impossible for it justly 
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to incline to its opposite. For without contradiction, the will could will 
the opposite, and thus it could justly will such; otherwise it could will 
something absolutely and not do so justly, which seems incongruous. "12 
Since God owes it to Himself to be of consistent purpose in creation, 
" ... where creatures are concerned, He is a debtor rather to His own 
generosity, in the sense that He gives creatures what their nature 
demands, which exigency in them is set down as something just, a kind 
of secondary object of justice, as it were ... "13 
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Scotus interprets this secondary obligation liberally, however, not as one to do 
what befits this or that particular creature, but to establish an appropriate order 
on the totality of things. 14 And Scotus seems to imply that God can establish a 
fitting order on any collection of possible created things He chooses or allows 
to be actualized. 15 
Likewise, it follows from Scotus' modified naturalism that rational free crea-
tures (if any) have an obligation to love God above all. 16 Thus, he writes, 
"that I should love God above all" "can be inferred demonstratively in 
the following fashion. 'God is that greater than which nothing can be 
thought; therefore he is supremely lovable; therefore I ought to love 
Him above all'. "17 
Accordingly, not even God can dispense anyone from this obligation. IX From 
the obligation to love God above all, there follows another: "free will is obliged 
to elicit every act in conformity with a superior rule-viz., according to divine 
precept. "19 
Thus far, Scotus thinks, a priori philosophizing will take us. God's infinite 
metaphysical or natural goodness imposes an obligation on Him and on creatures 
to love Him above all (to place Him first in the preference ranking and to love 
Him with greater intensity). But the finite natural goodness of creatures implies 
that God owes nothing to creatures and will not be unjust to any creature no 
matter what He does. Nor will He be unjust to Himself in creation provided He 
satisfies the minimal condition of establishing a fitting order on the whole collec-
tion of created things. 
2. The Generosity of Divine Purpose: 
For Scotus, a priori reasoning demonstrates, from God's metaphysical good-
ness, that perfect justice puts God under no obligations to creatures; but it is 
Christian soteriology that reveals God as a maximally organized lover of them. 20 
Moreover, Scotus' novel reading of tradition serves to magnify God's love and 
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generosity towards His elect. 
(2.1) Divine Love in Search of eo-Lovers: Scotus believes he can demonstrate 
(see section 1) that God loves Himself above all with friendship love (amor 
amicitiae)-that is, with a love that values the good for its own sake and not 
merely as a means to some other end. 21 Such love for a good is non-possessive, 
and expresses itself in part in the will that the good in question be loved the 
same way by others. Yet, insofar as loving that good is advantageous for the 
lover, the will that there should be co-lovers is an expression of love for the 
prospective co-lovers as well. The persons of the Trinity love the divine essence 
and each other with such friendship-love. That this love of the infinite good 
should be shared by still others is, for Scotus, God's principal motive in creation. 
Among possible creatures, only free agents could be elevated to share such 
friendship-love for God. To be sure, every possible being has a natural inclination 
or tendency for its own proper perfection. 22 But such an inclination would move 
a being towards God, only insofar as God was a means to or contributed towards 
its own proper perfection, and would not be towards God for His own sake. It 
is the ultimate differentia of rational free creatures that they have a double 
motivational drive: natural appetite, or affectio commodi, which is an inclination 
for its own advantage as perceived by its own intellect (perfected by hope), and 
affectio iustitiae, or the inclination for intrinsic goods for their own sake (perfected 
by charity). 23 The will of free creatures is, according to Scotus, a self-determining 
power for opposites that determines whether the free agent acts in accordance 
with the inclination for what is advantageous or the inclination for justice. It is 
only because such creatures share with God an inclination for justice, to love 
things for their own sake as they deserve to be loved, that they are minimally 
suited to be co-lovers of God. 
Since God is not under any obligation, whether to Himself or to possible 
creatures, to give them real existence, His making free creatures whose obligation 
it is to love God above all, is a first act of generosity. But divine liberality goes 
further in its desire to raise such persons above their natural possibilities by 
granting them the beatific vision and such steadfastness of friendship love for 
God as would be sufficient for created happiness. 24 Thus, Scotus joins the 
medieval consensus that God who has no obligation to create anything and no 
obligation to creatures to do one thing rather than another in relation to them, 
in being true to Himself generously wills that finite and temporal persons be 
raised to the incommensurate good of face to fact loving intimacy with the 
infinite and eternal God. Of such surprising generosity, Scotus writes, 
" ... Not only does God's infinite goodness or His nature as this unique 
nature in its uniqueness draw us to love such, but because 'Goodness' 
loves me, sharing itself with me, therefore I elicit an act of love towards 
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it. "25 
(2.2) The Structure of God's Intentions in Creation: Scotus' theological orig-
inality shows in his detailed articulation of God's purpose. Even though there 
is no temporal succession in God's deliberation and willing, but He wills whatever 
He wills immutably in the now of eternity, nevertheless, Scotus thinks it is 
possible to distinguish a logical order within His purpose, a natural priority and 
posteriority, and so to locate the willing of different objects at different "instants 
of nature." 
Since God is the most well-organized of lovers, God wills first the end and 
then the proximate and remote means to that end. 2" According to Scotus, (a) 
God's end in creation is for created persons to share with the Trinity in the 
intimate friendship-love of God above all. Within this end, however, the primary 
finite object of divine love is the rational soul of Christ. According to Scotus' 
daring conception, God so loved the rational soul of Christ that He wanted to 
create it and be intimately loved by it whether or not any other creatures existed. 27 
Happily for us, however, God has willed that Christ should be the head of many 
co-lovers,28 whose number includes angels and other human souls. 29 
(b) Second, God wills the proximate means to that end. Since the end raises 
created persons above what is naturally possible or required for them, something 
must be done to fit them for such intimacy with the eternal Trinity. Where Christ 
is concerned, his human soul is fitted for the intimacy of the beatific vision by 
hypostatic union with the Divine Word. Sometimes Scotus explains this by saying 
that it wasfitting for what subsisted in the Word to be raised to a higher glory 
than is appropriate to a pure creature. '11 Other times, Scotus evidences the pull 
of ancient naturalism, which insists that better beings should be loved more, 
when he says that hypostatic union makes it fitting for God to love the soul of 
Christ more than an angel. 31 Thus, the union of intimate love is given a metaphys-
ical ground in the hypostatic union. 32 Further, the soul of Christ is confirmed in 
beatitude from the first instant of its creation; as steadfast in its friendship-love 
of God above all, that soul is impeccable. 3l 
Angels and other human souls are fitted for sharing the divine love life by 
infused grace. God freely and contingently legislates a system of merit which 
creates conventional and statutory connections between the finite and temporal 
acts and states of created persons on the one hand, and divine acceptance, infused 
grace, and eternal glory on the other. Thus, the finite and temporal acts and 
states of created persons are given eternal significance. 
(c) Third, God wills the remote means to His end. Scotus notes, "God is said 
to do what is right in a creature from the way He makes one created thing 
correspond to another ... because the created nature demands this as something 
suited to it. "34 Human rational souls are incomplete beings and are naturally 
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metaphysical constituents of rational animals. Thus, it was fitting for God to 
produce the physical world, so that the rational souls of men could be fittingly 
joined to bodies. On this construal, Scotus approves Aristotle's claim that man 
is the end for the sake of which the physical world exists. 35 
(2.3) Evil as "Occasional": Notice that Scotus' charter of God's principal 
ends in creation and the proximate and remote means thereto ignores evils 
completely. This is deliberate. So far as the origin of evil is concerned, Scotus 
adopts what is known nowadays as a "free will defense." According to him, "all 
goods are attributed to God and all evils to us. "36 Rational free creatures and 
hence the possibility of sin are necessary for God's primary objective-the 
community of co-lovers, created as well as divine. But, pace Leibniz, actual sin 
is not a logically (metaphysically) necessary constituent of the Best of All Possible 
World. Nor, pace Aquinas, is actual sin required for the manifestation of divine 
goodness-so that God may show Himself just in punishing and merciful in 
sparing sinners.37 Actual sin is not a logically (metaphysically) necessary means 
to, or a logically (metaphysically) or even naturally necessary consequence of 
God's principally intended end. Neither is the evil resulting from sin's punish-
ment. 38 To make clear just how marginal evils are to the divine purpose, Scotus 
examines the natural priorities of God's will in more detail. 
(2.3.1) Predestination and Sin: Against the current of theological opinion, 
Scotus declares that neither the Incarnation or the predestination of Christ-any 
more than the predestination of anyone else-was dependent upon sin or 
occasioned by prior guilt. 39 "Before any merit and before any demerit, He intends 
Christ to be united to Himself in the unity of the supposit"; otherwise, it would 
follow that God's highest work-viz., Christ-was occasioned by sin, which 
would show bad priorities and belie the claim that God is the most well-organized 
of lovers.4o Rather, 
"First, God desires Himself; second He desires Himself in others; third, 
He wills that He be desired by one who can love Him in the highest 
degree that he can be loved by someone external; fourth, He intends 
the union of the nature which ought to love Him in the highest degree 
even if no one fell. "41 
As before, Scotus insists that according to God's actual priorities, the predesti-
nation of the soul of Christ follows only God's self-love and general desire for 
created co-lovers; the Incarnation is a suitable means to that end. 
Likewise, for other free creatures, God predestines or not at an instant of 
nature prior to any foreseen sin. Scotus outlines the sequence as follows (where 
n I, n2, ... stand for instants of nature; Michael and Lucifer are angels, and 
Peter and Judas, the disciples of those names): 
nl: Michael and Lucifer, Peter and Judas are represented to God 
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as alike in natural features; 
God wills glory for Michael and Peter, 
and elicits no positive act regarding Lucifer and Judas. 
112: God wills grace-faith, merits, and a good use of free will-
for Michael and Peter, 
and elicits no positive act regarding Lucifer and Judas. 
n4: God wills to permit Michael and Lucifer, Peter and Judas to 
sin (and therefore wills not to obstruct their exercise of 
free choice so as to eliminate the possibility of sin) 
n5: Lucifer and Judas are presented to God as ones who will commit 
the sin of final impenitence 
and God justly punishes or reprobates Lucifer and Judas:' 
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According to Scotus' theology, predestination is naturally prior to and not deter-
mined by foreseen free choice, because it raises the created person to a destiny 
not possible for him by nature alone; but reprobation is naturally simultaneous 
with foreseen sin, because "God is not a punisher before man is a debtor. "43 
Again, "the complete foreordination and predestination of the elect is prior to 
anything being actually done about the reprobate, lest anyone should rejoice at 
the fall of another. "44 Elect human souls were not-pace Anselm--created and 
elevated to take the places forfeited by fallen angels. 
(2.:1 .2) God's Response to Sin,' In his effort to dissociate God from the entrance 
of evil into the universe, Scotus represents God's planning as ignoring sin until 
the last possible moment. His reasoning hints at a tacit reliance on the following 
controversial principles: 
and 
(P I) an agent is responsible for his principally intended ends and the 
(proximate and remote) ;means thereto in a way in which he is 
not responsible for the side-effects occasioned thereby 
(P2) an agent is more responsible for his positive acts and their con~;e-
quences than for his omissions and their consequences. 
On Scotus' account (see section I), however, God's only responsibilities are to 
Himself. And whatever may be said about (PI) in general, God's truth to Himself 
would mean not only choosing appropriate (proximate and remote) means to His 
ends, but also effecting a fitting integration of the unintended side-effects into 
His over-all purposes. Likewise, whether or not (P2) holds for created agents, 
surely the omniscient, omnipotent, and maximally organized lover would not be 
true to Himself were He to let His goals be obstructed by simple and avoidable 
omissions. 
Scotus can consistently claim that God's justice survives His permission of 
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sin, only if God can work sin and its (logically/metaphysically or naturally) 
necessary consequences into a providential order that allows Him to achieve the 
generous aims Scotus ascribes to Him. This He docs, Scotus thinks, by redeeming 
the elect45 and punishing sin.46 Moreover, God's choice among possible redemp-
tive strategies amplifies His love for the elect by joining the generosity of (the 
human soul of) Christ to that of God Himself and allowing the best beloved to 
serve the less favored. 
(2.3.3) Redemption of the Elect from Sin: Scotus' doctrine of the atonement 
is one of the most innovative pieces of his theology and affords a striking contrast 
to that of his eminent predecessor, St. Anselm. Both agree (i) that since God is 
a being a greater than which cannot be thought He is infinitely worthy of honor 
and love; (ii) that God's principal purpose in creation is to have created co-lovers 
who will be made happy thereby; (iii) that God's purpose is primafacie obstructed 
by sin; (iv) that the standards of divine justice are somehow prior to divine 
choice; and (v) that these standards of justice require God to be of consistent 
purpose and not let created persons decisively obstruct His plans. 
In Cur Deus Homo, however, Anselm begins by conceding a premiss to which 
Scotus is fundamentally opposed-evil that it would be unfitting for the highest 
possible nature to join itself to a finite and temporal creature in hypostatic union 
apart from some necessary reason-and goes on to argue that the Incarnation 
was the only possible way for God to accomplish His original purpose in creation, 
given the fact of human sin. Anselm's argument seems to assume; (vii) that 
these standards require satisfaction for an offense against the supreme nature; 
and (viii) that this satisfaction must be proportionate to the worthiness of the 
offended party. Since (ix) worthiness is proportionate to degree of being (see 
section 1 above), it follows by (i) and (viii) that any offense against God is 
infinitely culpable. Likewise, by (ix), it follows that no created act could be 
infinitely meritorious. Therefore, only God could do something meritorious 
enough to make satisfaction for sin against God. Further, Anselm contends, even 
if an angel could do something infinitely meritorious, it would be unfitting for 
the human debt to be paid by a created person not of Adam's race. For fallen 
humans would then be obliged in the first instance to their created benefactor 
rather than to God. Relying on a principle of collective responsibility, Anselm 
concludes, that the debt will be fittingly paid only by a member of Adam's 
indebted race. Hence a God-man, who was both able to pay and a member of 
the race that ought to pay, was necessary. 
Scotus begins his critique of Anselm by taking issue with (vii) and (viii), the 
assumption that in the redemptive order matters of fittingness are determined by 
standards of justice independent of the divine will. Rather, just as nothing about 
angelic or human natures could make created persons fit for the beatific vision 
by their very natures, but rather they are predestined to it by a free and contingent 
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divine volition; so no created act or state is, by its very nature, acceptable or 
meritorious, but is so only by freely instituted divine statutes. Thus, Scotus 
writes, "every created offering holds good only to the extent that God accepts 
it and not more"4' and something counts as "merit because accepted, but not 
vice versa."48 A fortiori, which (if any) created act counts as satisfaction for sin 
is a matter of God's free and contingent volition. 
It follows, contrary to (viii), that God is not obliged to demand an offering 
that is ontologically commensurate with His nature. This is a good thing, too, 
because, if He were, not even an Incarnation would meet the Anselmian require-
ments of justice. For if it is a member of Adam's race who must pay, Scotus 
reasons, then the acts of redemptive significance would be those of the human 
soul of Christ, not those of the divine will. Yet, all of the acts of Christ's human 
soul are finite and ontologically incommensurate with the divine essence. Hypo-
static union does not change the acts of a human soul from finite to infinite. 49 
Thus, God would be free to accept as satisfaction a formally finite act by 
which the sinful creature himself loves God more intensely than he formerly 
loved the created object in preference to God. 50 God willing, 
" ... if Adam, through the gifts of grace and charity, had one or many 
acts of loving God for His own sake by a greater force of free will than 
was the force of sinning, such love would have sufficed for remitting 
his sin and could have made satisfaction ... "51 
Likewise, God could accept such an act of love from a good angel or from 
another mere man conceived without sin and graced by God. 52 Nor, contrary to 
Anselm, would this mean that redeemed humans were obliged to their created 
benefactor rather than to God, but "to God alone because all he [i.e., the created 
benefactor] had would have been from God."53 And it would be only by virtue 
of contingent divine legislation that his finite act counted as meritorious enough 
for redemption. In sum, we are "always, finally, and maximally obliged to God 
as to the one from whom all goods proceed. "54 
On Scotus' account, God's actual redemptive strategy explodes the Anselmian 
assumption-that where possible God respects the ontological proprieties, that 
the lower and less worthy should serve the higher and more admirable (i.e., that 
he abides by (vii), (viii), and (ix))-at a still deeper level. For where God-who 
is entitled to set the rules for redemption any way He wishes--could have chosen 
any created person as redeemer, He in fact elected, with the generous cooperation 
of the soul of Christ, the created being He loves most, so that the higher serves 
the lower. Again, although there was no metaphysical necessity for God to cast 
any of the divine persons as characters in the redemptive plot, God preferred to 
enter the action Himself and chose that human soul to which the Divine Word 
was already intimately united in hypostatic union. And, Scotus would contend, 
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it is precisely in making such choices that God shows consistency of purpose 
(and hence manifests His justice): the creator who takes the initiative to join 
finite and temporal persons to the infinite and eternal in beatific vision and love 
of God, also is joined in hypostatic union to the human soul whose finite and 
temporal acts He accepts for the world's redemption. 
According to God's actual scenario, the human soul of Christ chooses to 
participate in divine judgment by confronting the religious leaders of His com-
munity with their sin. 
". . . Thus, it should be believed that that man suffered for the sake of 
justice. For he saw the evils of the Jews which they did and how by 
disordered and distorted affection they were attracted to their law. They 
did not even permit men to be healed on the Sabbath, and yet they drew 
out a sheep or cow from the pit on the Sabbath, and many others. 
Therefore. Christ, wishing to caJl them back from that error through 
deeds and words, preferred to die rather than to be silent, since truth 
needed to be spoken to the Jews. Therefore, He died for justice ... "55 
In this, Christ was obedient to God's call and purpose for Him. But with loving 
generosity for His fellows, He wished to turn the passion, which sin rejecting 
judgment effected, for a redemptive purpose. 
" ... Nevertheless, in fact His [i.e., Christ's 1 grace ordained His passion 
and offered it to the Father for us. Therefore, we are very much obliged 
to Him. For by the fact that man could have been redeemed otherwise 
and yet by His free will He redeemed us this way, we are very much 
obliged to Him and more so than if He had done so necessarily and we 
could not have been redeemed another way. Therefore, for the sake of 
attracting us to His love, as I believe, He chiefly did this, and because 
He wished man to be bound more fully to God. For example. if someone 
had begotten the first man and afterwards instructed him in discipline 
and sanctity, he would have been more obliged to him than if he had 
only begotten him and someone else had instructed him. This is fitting-
ness, not necessity. "56 
God, contemplating His response to sin in the now of eternity, sees Christ's 
obedience, His passion, and His generous offer, and freely and contingently 
decides to accept it, thereby electing Him redeemer of the world. In order for 
Christ to play this dual role, as head of the community of co-lovers and as 
redeemer of Adam's race, He must have a flesh that is able to suffer. Therefore, 
although apart from sin and in accord with His first role, Christ would have 
been endowed with a glorified body from the beginning,57 the latter glory was 
delayed so that He might fill the role of mediator by suffering the passion. 58 
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Scotus summarizes his account of God's redemptive plans in the following 
passage: 
'This, then, was the order of divine intentions: (i) first God understood 
Himself under the aspect of the highest good; (ii) in the second sign, 
He understood all others, creatures; (iii) in the third, He predestined to 
glory and grace, and concerning the others He had a negative act by 
not predestining them; (iv) in the fourth, He foresees those who will 
fall away in Adam; (v) in the fifth, He foreordained or intended the 
remedy-how they would be redeemed through the passion of His Son. 
Thus, Christ in the f1esh, like all the other elect, was intended and 
predestined to grace and glory, prior to His intending the passion of 
Christ as medicine against the fall, the way a doctor wills a man's health 
prior to ordering healing medicine. 
"Moreover, just as the elect were predestined prior to His intending 
the passion of Christ as a remedy against their fall, so the whole Trinity 
ordained the predestinate and elect to grace and final glory, so far as 
efficient [causality] is concerned, prior to intending the passion of Christ 
as medicine to be taken for the elect who fall in Adam, already predes-
tined to final glory. And just as the Word intends His passion to be 
offered to the Father for the predestined and elect, and so efficaciously 
offered it in effect, so the whole Trinity efficaciously accepted the 
passion for them, and it was efficaciously offered for no others or 
accepted from eternity. Therefore, He merited for them the first grace 
ordaining them to consummate glory. This much so far as the efficacy 
of merit is concerned. "59 
3. The Surd of Reprobation: 
If Scotus' emphasis on God's freedom from obligation to creatures (see section 
above) and on the irrelevance of evil to His purpose (see section 2 above) 
serves to magnify God's generosity towards the elect, it makes reprobation at 
best mysterious. According to Scotus, God establishes order on the sin by 
punishing it.6() With the elect, punishment is tempered by mitigating mercy61 in 
redemption (see section 2.3.2 above). With the reprobate it is eternal: they are 
forever given over to their guilt62 and the torment of their inordinate appetites, 
depri ved of both natural and supernatural happiness, and made to suffer perpetual 
fiery torment, which distracts their intellects so much that they can think of 
nothing else.'" For the reprobate, the setting of their finite and temporal acts in 
relation to the infinite and eternal God has given their earthly lives eternal 
significance. But it does so by serving them a fate as much worse than natural 
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animal mortalitY,64 as heavenly bliss is better than natural enjoyments. How can 
this piece of doctrine be made to fit with Scotus' general sketch of God's character 
and purposes in creation? 
(3.1) Justice to Creatures? As Anselm had noted, the justice of one person's 
action towards another can be considered three ways: from the angle of the 
act-type, from the side of the actor, and from the side of the person acted upon. 
Anselm then argued that sins not infinitely culpable so far as the act-type was 
concerned, tum out so to be when considered as an offense against an infinitely 
worthy ruler. It follows that when God condemns unrepentant sinners to eternal 
punishment, His action is fitting because it assigns them their just deserts. 65 
Scotus will agree that the fit between sin and reprobation is one of just deserts, 
but the claim will not have explanatory value within his theory, given his con-
tention that finite created acts, in and of themselves, have no eternal significance 
whatever. That they merit eternal bliss or deserve unending torment, is a product 
of God's free and contingent statutes, not of naturalistically grounded claims of 
justice. God could have legislated otherwise or not at all (see section 2.3.3 
above). Our present question is whether and how the legislation which defines 
eternal deserts fits with Scotus' account of God's character and purposes in 
creation. 
Scotus himself exploits the other side of this coin, maintaining that since God 
has no obligations to creatures, He is !lot unjust to them in (a) creating some 
persons whom (b) He omits to ordain to glory and (c) omits to furnish with the 
graces necessary for perseverance; nor is He unjust (d) in naming the above 
torments (instead sayar lighter ones, or annihilation after judgment) as the 
penalty for sinning to the end. As Scotus says, "when equals are apprehended, 
it [=the highest goodness] wills to share the good unequally and there is no 
injustice in this ... because nothing is owed. "06 And he supplements this a 
priori consideration with an analogy: a king is not obliged to accept anyone into 
the family of his household and may simply accept these and not those, apart 
from any injustice. 67 
(3.2) God's Justice to Himself Scotus has claimed that God's only obligation 
is to His own goodness, that He love it, and that He follow through on what 
Love purposes. Within Scotus' framework (which contingently equates God's 
justice to Himself with His generosity towards creatures), our question remains, 
whether God can be true to Himself, if He weaves the sin of the reprobate into 
His cosmic plot by knotting it with eternal punishment? The answer, in my 
judgment, is that He cannot. 
If, as Scotus' maintains, God's only reason for creating persons is that love 
of the infinite good be shared more widely, then Scotus is surely right to insist 
that sin and the evils resulting from its punishment are not necessary for this 
aim. Even granting that punishment may be rehabilitative for the predestinate, 
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it seems obvious that the eternal torment of the reprobate described by Scotus 
represents the defeat of God's purpose in those persons. Moreover, it seems to 
contradict the love to which God is supposed, above all, to remain true. If Scotus 
celebrates the supra-natural divine generosity evidenced in the elevation of the 
elect, he refuses to peer down the dark chasm of equally supra-natural divine 
cruelty projected in the doom of the damned. 
Moreover, these failures look culpable, because seemingly God could have 
done otherwise. If the reprobate are neither constituents of or means to His 
chosen ends, could He not have planned ahead and not created them in the first 
place? or having decided to create them, surely it was within His power to 
include them among the predestinate? Are not His omissions horrendous failures 
of follow-through? 
(3.3) The Excuse of Divine Ignorance? This last objection presupposes that 
God had knowledge of which free persons were going to persist in sin and which 
ones were not at an instant of nature prior to His decisions about which ones to 
create and/or predestine. On Scotus' account (see section 2.3.1 above), this is 
not so: God decides to create at nO, to predestine or not at n 1, to distribute grace 
or not at n2, to permit sin at n3, and then only at n4 sees which created persons 
sin to the end and which do not. Scotus would thus meet my complaint against 
God's kindness-that He should have used His knowledge to forestall reproba-
tion-by holding that God does not know "soon" enough, in the natural order 
of priorities. 68 
Scotus is not clearly entitled to this rejoinder, however, because he sometimes 
(although not always69) holds that God's acts and omissions at nO-n3 are sufficient 
for the persistence in sin foreseen at n4. Not that what God does is a total 
efficient positive cause of the created volition-since it is impossible, given the 
nature of will as a self-determining power for opposites (see section 2.1 above), 
for one agent to be the total efficient cause of the volitions of another. 70 Rather 
it is His own foreseen non-cooperation with the circumstances that would make 
the created volition count as morally good and meritorious that is sufficient for 
the created volition being sinfuF' or at least "negatively, not good."72 If God 
could have certain foreknowledge of who will sin to the end on the basis of His 
own acts, omissions, and permissions at nO-n3, then it would seem that He is 
in a position to know the general proposition 
(P3) Whomever I pass over and assign no grace will sin to the end, if 
I permit it 
from the beginning at nO. The objection would then rearise: why did not God 
make use of His knowledge of (P3) in deciding whom to create and how to 
distribute grace, or to form a policy of predestining and giving grace to everyone 
He creates? Or if God permitted any to sin to the end, why did He not use His 
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legislative powers to lighten the sanctions and to prolong into purgatory (for as 
long as necessary) the opportunities for a favorable response? Why did He not 
use His creative imagination to design post-mortem conditions optimal for repen-
tance, while allowing the recalcitrant as much happiness as is metaphysically 
compatible with that goal? In not doing so, He seems unfaithful to the general 
creative purposes Scotus assigns to Him. 
Faced with the dogma of reprobation, Scotus' bottom-line answer is that we 
don't know why God creates some whom He omits to predestine, or why He 
assigns to the reprobate a punishment so severe; "no reason can be given for 
this except the divine will. "n 
4. Conclusion: 
I will conclude by measuring Scotus' picture of divine goodness in terms of 
its power to show the compossibility of God and evil. (4.1) The Resourcefulness 
of Scotus' Theory: According to Scotus, God's infinite metaphysical or natural 
goodness implies that God has no obligations to creatures to will one thing rather 
than another. This consequence erases the question of whether human suffering 
and death of the sort found in this world is logically consistent with perfect 
divine justice to creatures. The only question of justice left is whether it is 
logically possible for such evils to exist in a world in which God is true to 
Himself, i.e., "of consistent purpose." According to Scotus, the only necessary 
aspect of divine purpose is that He love Himself above all and for His own sake. 
So the compossibility of God and evil can be exhibited within Scotus' framework, 
if there is some logically possible situation in which God is of consistent purpose 
in both (i) loving Himself above all and for His own sake, while (ii) making 
created persons and allowing them to sin and suffer temporal evils such as we 
experience. A modification of Scotus' soteriological plot-line suggests a story 
in which these conditions would be satisfied: viz., one that differs from his actual 
proposal, in that God predestines and graces all of the persons He creates; one 
in which, should any sin to the point of death, He continues to create post-mortem 
opportunities until they repent. Such a world is logically possible even from 
Scotus' perspective. Further, it would be one in which God was immeasurably 
loving to all created persons, in ordaining them to the supernatural glory of the 
beatific vision and love of Himself, as by choosing to use for human redemption 
the human soul He loved most and to which He was joined in hypostatic union. 
Thus, Scotus' value-theory is resourceful enough to show how (i) and (ii) could 
be consistently incorporated in a triumph of divine generosity. 
(4.2) Objections to this theory will be many and varied. For now, I shall pause 
to clear away two, which do not strike me as decisive. (a) First, some will 
contend that the above scenario is not really logically possible, because the 
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notions of divine generosity and Incarnation are both contradictory. For generosity 
is measured in terms of the resources of the giver; since God's resources are 
unlimited, He (like the multi-millionaire) is too rich to be generous. 74 Again. it 
seems metaphysically necessary that each individual have one and only one 
essential nature; but the Incarnation requires that one person have two. 
(b) Further, some will say, that even if divine generosity were logically pos-
sible, the above world-story does not cast God as generous, but rather as cruel 
and foolish. For, according to Scotus, the sufferings of Christ were not necessary 
for our salvation; He could have "let us off' with a simple apology. Is it not 
both silly and sadistic of Him to choose the passion and death of His best beloved 
creature as a way of redeeming the world? How can He thereby be true to His 
own love for the soul of Chrisp75 Moreover, human sufferings in via would limit 
God's generosity towards the elect. As neither logically nor metaphysically 
necessary for God's intended end, they would serve no purpose and thus have 
no meaning. How can He thereby be true to His own putative generosity to 
creatures? 
(Ra) To the first, Scotus defends the logical and metaphysical possibility of 
the Incarnation with a subtle revision of the metaphysics of substance, which I 
have elsewhere76 commended as worthy of contemporary consideration. As for 
generosity, Scotus might reply, its measures are manifold: e.g., the absolute 
size of the gift, its relation to the donor's resources, to the recipient's need or 
title thereto, etc. His deepest answer, however, is that it can be generous to give 
yourself, no matter how rich in other resources you may be. According to Scotus, 
this is exactly what God does in the Incarnation, which is primarily a means to 
the end of His love-life with Christ, and secondarily an expression of God's 
commitment to the finite and temporal order. 
(Rb) Not only that. In the possible world under discussion (like the actual 
world, according to Scotus), God does not choose to save us through the pain 
and suffering of someone else. Rather, via the Incarnation, God continues to 
give Himself, making His own pain and sufferings by which our redemption is 
won. Moreover, it is not even metaphysically or logically possible that human 
suffering and death limit God's generosity towards the elect, given His sharing 
of the intimate love-life of the Trinity, a good incommensurate with temporal 
evils. On the contrary, by voluntarily sharing this burden without trying to shirk 
it, God's people would likewise participate in His commitment to the finite and 
created order. 
(4.3) The Inadequacy of Scotus' Actual Account: Scotus' soteriology provides 
us with his account of how God is actually solving the problem of evil. As I 
have argued (in section 3 above), reprobation is the rock on which the ship of 
Scotus' theodicy would founder. For in showing Himself (not unjust) but cruel 
to the reprobate, adding "eternal torment" to the sufferings of this present life," 
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God also fails to be true to Himself, to the super-abundant generosity of purpose 
that Scotus attributes to Him. 
Scotus' options for dealing with the surd of reprobation were severely limited 
by the theological climate of his time. The doctrine of reprobation seemed to 
have a Biblical base and was for that reason uncontestable. Scotus could have 
reverted to Anselmian int1exibility and limited God's justifiable options for 
dealing with sin, but this move would have undercut the dramatic (and in my 
view, attractive) picture of God's generosity to the elect that is so distinctive of 
Scotus' doctrine of the atonement (see section 2.3.2 above). Alternatively, Scotus 
could have modified his doctrine of predestination, so that predestination and 
reprobation were naturally simultaneous, alike dependent upon and hence natur-
ally posterior to foreseen free choices, thereby eliminating the mind-boggling 
thought that a person's eternal destiny might depend on a gratuitous divine 
omission. Such doctrines of predestination were espoused by Henry of Ghent 
and William Ockham and bring their own difficulties, which I must pass over 
here. 77 Not even this step would entirely absolve God of inconstancy of purpose, 
however, so long as Scotus continued to insist upon God's freedom to set up 
the eternal rewards and penalties any way He wants. 
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